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Abstract
In 2001, the federal government introduced the Affordable Housing Initiative as a means
of stimulating the increased production of affordable housing. This represented its first significant
commitment to affordable housing construction since its exit from the housing sector in the early
1990s. The program involved an investment of over $1 billion spread over 5 years. In Ontario,
over $364 million was directed towards the production of rental and supportive housing, of which
Toronto received some $79 million. This has resulted in the construction of some 1,135 new
affordable rental units in Toronto.
This paper considered the on the ground impacts of the Affordable Housing Initiative on
the City of Toronto. In doing so, it examined the shifts in housing policy within Canada, and
specifically Ontario with a focus on welfarism, neoliberalism and post-welfarism. A series of indepth interviews was conducted with key housing stakeholders within the housing sector
including representatives of the City of Toronto, Toronto Community Housing, and housing
advocates. This has allowed for a multifaceted analysis of the program’s impacts on affordable
housing in the city.
The findings suggest that despite the introduction of the Affordable Housing Initiative,
Toronto’s affordable housing system has witnessed an increased reliance on the private sector,
and the perpetuation of band-aid solutions. This has been a result of the federal government
divesting itself of the burden of initiating and delivering social programs. Within the context of a
post-welfare state that has been influenced by neoliberalism, this is an expected outcome. It is
also noted, however, that housing policy at the local level has been subjected to provincial
oversight by the Ontario Municipal Board. This serves to attenuate the influences of NIMBYism
on land-use policies that are associated with the construction of affordable housing. Given the
findings, the following recommendations are made: a) the senior levels of government commit to
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a long-term, consistent and substantive funding program; b) the federal government adopt a more
realistic interpretation of what is meant by affordable housing; and c) provincial oversight be
maintained during the planning and construction of affordable housing.
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1

Introduction

a. Research Question
There is a growing housing affordability crisis within the Toronto region that is much
larger than that of any other Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) in Canada. When compared to
Vancouver (15 per cent) and Montreal (12 per cent), Toronto had the highest percentage of
households in core housing need at 17 per cent in 2007 (CMHC, 2010)1. These households tended
to spend more than 30 per cent of their income on rent, and resided in housing that was
inadequate in size and condition (CMHC, 2010; City of Toronto, 2009). This burgeoning crisis
has been attributed to several factors, including senior level government inactivity on the issue of
affordable housing.
In Ontario, the senior levels of government have persistently cut their level of funding for
affordable housing over the last 20 years. The most notable decrease occurred during the early
1990s where the federal and provincial governments removed themselves from the housing
sector. More specifically, affordable housing responsibilities including its on-going funding and
management were downloaded onto municipalities. This has resulted in an exponential increase
in municipal housing expenditures, rising from some $145 million in 1997 to over $1.5 billion in
2008 (Statistics Canada, 2009) 2. In contrast, federal housing expenditures were restricted to about
$2 billion annually between 1995 and 1997 (Fallis, 2010). During this same period, the province
limited its funding to $42 million annually with $215 million directed towards one-time capital
upgrades to existing housing (Graham & Phillips, 1998). According to Pomeroy (2007), these
drastic cuts represented a decrease of almost $700 million from a peak of 4.1 billion in 1993. In
both cases, there was no direct spending for the creation of new affordable rental units. Rather,
1

Refer to Appendix I for a graphical comparison of the incidence of core housing need within select
CMAs.
2
Refer to Appendix II for a graphical representation of Ontario municipalities’ current housing expenditure
vs. federal and provincial specific purpose transfers, 1988-2008. It should be noted that the federal and
provincial figures presented represent only transfers to municipalities. Consequently, they do not provide
an account of the decrease in direct spending on affordable housing.
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these funds were meant to maintain the existing affordable rental stock. This lack of funding has
resulted in a drastic drop in the production of affordable rental units, averaging out to some 1000
units being built annually between 1996 and 2001. This represented a significant decrease from
the late 1970s and early 1980s of 20,000 units yearly (Shapcott, 2007).
On a local level, cities such as Toronto have witnessed the intensification of an affordable
housing crisis. More than 640,000 Torontonians including seniors, people with disabilities and
recent immigrants, require some form of assistance in meeting their housing needs (City of
Toronto, 2009). Of these, 216,000 households are in core housing need with some 66,000
currently on the social housing waiting list (City of Toronto, 2011a & b).
In an effort to address this crisis, the federal government introduced the Affordable
Housing Initiative (AHI) in 2001. In many respects, the AHI was considered the federal
government’s reengagement within the affordable housing sector since its exit during the early
1990s. It is premised on providing grants to local level housing providers with the purpose of
stimulating the increased production of affordable rental units. In Ontario, the AHI is operated
under the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing (C-OAH) program. This is a multilateral
agreement with the federal, provincial and municipal governments on a cost-matching basis of
federal grants (CMHC, 2007).
The research question that this paper seeks to explore is: in what ways has the
reengagement of the federal government within the affordable housing sector, through the COAH program, influenced the delivery of affordable housing in post-amalgamated Toronto?
More specifically, I am interested in examining the on the ground effects of this program on the
City of Toronto, a large urban center that is home to a burgeoning vulnerable population.
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b. Theoretical Framework
In exploring this research question, it is important to ground the analysis within a
particular theoretical framework or lens. This, according to Stelman (2005) will assist in
imposing a certain frame of reference on the reality that is being examined. The theoretical lenses
chosen for this paper relate to neoliberalism and post-welfarism. In the broadest of views,
neoliberalism refers to the retrenchment of government with an emphasis on ‘individual choice’
and the markets. Neoliberal policies are used by governments to deregulate and privatise
government functions while reducing its size and control. It tends to promote fiscal conservatism
through cost cutting measures rather than government spending (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006;
Kiel, 2002).
This is a useful framework for informing our discussion as it has been argued that the
1990s may have well represented the peak of neoliberalism within Ontario (see Hackworth &
Moriah, 2006; Kiel, 2002). The election of Mike Harris and the Progressive Conservatives under
the banner of the Common Sense Revolution (CSR) saw the retrenchment of government. The
CSR movement supported a shift towards a minimalist form of government, and a reliance on the
market and private sector in providing and managing affordable housing (Hackworth & Moriah,
2006).
I have suggested that the 2000s, when the AHI was created, has witnessed a movement
towards a post-welfare state that has been heavily influenced by neoliberal ideologies. As a result,
it is important to examine how housing policy responses are framed at the senior levels of
government, and how they are translated on the ground. Within the context of this paper, it was
hypothesised that the emergence of the post-welfare state has resulted in the federal government
placing fewer social expenditure burdens on itself. This in turn has resulted in a reliance on the
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ground on non-governmental actors such as the private for-profit and non-profit sectors in social
service delivery.

5
2

Case Selection and Research Methods
In order to explore the proposed research question, a triangulated approach was used that

involved an extensive literature review and in-depth interviews. This method is one that has been
used within the housing studies literature, and has been subjected to rigorous peer-reviewed
evaluations.
a. Why study the City of Toronto?
In examining the issue of affordable housing, the City of Toronto presented a unique case
study within Ontario. The city has been facing a chronic affordable housing pandemic since the
early 1990s. This has, arguably, been attributed to the rise of neoliberalism in Ontario (Keil,
2002). For example, the total households in need of affordable housing have increased from some
137,000 in 1991 to more than 216,000 in 2006, representing a 58 per cent increase (City of
Toronto, 2011a). Many of these households are part of a burgeoning dependent population that is
marginalised and ignored within the city. As suggested by Boudreau, Keil and Young (2009), this
is due to the fact that the housing market has been dominated by the private sectors, which have
tended to focus on the homeownership component rather than the rental market. In fact, from
2000 to 2002, only 3 per cent of new housing construction in Toronto was for rental units
compared to 97 per cent for the home-ownership market (City of Toronto, 2003). Consequently,
the C-OAH program represented a pivotal initiative in addressing this chronic crisis. The premise
of the program is to stimulate the production of affordable housing, which is targeted towards the
rising dependent population. Also, given the fact that Toronto has been heavily influenced by
neoliberal ideologies during the 1990s, I was able to examine its impacts on the post-welfare
state.
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b. Literature review
A historical review of social housing policy in Canada was conducted with a focus on its
policy shifts from welfarism to neoliberalism and most recently, post-welfarism. The premise of
this was to set the context within which affordable housing in Ontario evolved throughout the
years. In doing so, an extensive review of recent studies, particularly within the last decade was
consulted. This included a thorough review of scholarly journals, periodicals, government
documents and publications from non-governmental organisations. Also, a literature review of the
management of social housing in Ontario with key recommendations for housing policy reform
was conducted. This was primarily used to inform the discussion and analyses of interview
results. I further examined existing statistics gathered from Statistics Canada, ONPHA, the
CMHC, and the City of Toronto’s Affordable Housing Office.
c. Interviews
In order to obtain a better understanding of the on the ground effects of the C-OAH
program on the City of Toronto, I attempted to contact ten housing agencies representing various
aspects of the housing sector. This included staff from the City of Toronto’s Affordable Housing
Office, planners, the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), housing advocates, and
non-profit and private sector organisations. However, only four respondents opted to participate
in the study. These included two civil servants from the City of Toronto - a representative from
the Affordable Housing Office and a senior planner from the Planning Department; a member
from the TCHC; and a housing advocate from a well-known equity rights agency in Ontario.
Given this relatively small sample size, I opted to conduct in-depth semi-structured
interviews with respondents so as to gain a comprehensive analysis of the issue facing the city.
The interview process lasted approximately one to two hours, and was premised on a series of
hypotheses that were developed through the literature review process (refer to Section 4).
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Specifically, I focused on the influences of neoliberalism on a post-welfare state. Much like
Jinha’s (2009) approach, the interviews were initiated using a series of prepared questions with
the purpose of engaging respondents in a meaningful manner. This included a review of their
work in the housing sector, and their interactions with the C-OAH program. As the interview
process continued, respondents were allowed to elaborate and highlight key aspects that they
deemed to be critical to the program, while also addressing the research question. This allowed
for a more exploratory approach to the interview process. It should be noted that interview texts
were reported anonymously to protect informant identity.
In interpreting the results, interview notes were re-typed and organised into major themes
based on the research question and hypotheses. In some cases, new and distinct categories were
created as these issues were not initially considered during the literature review process. This
included the influences of NIMBYism and the role of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB).
d. Study strengths and limitations
There are several advantages to having a triangulated approach. Firstly, by reviewing the
evolution of housing policy, I was able to utilise a wide variety of data sources to gain an
extensive understanding of the policy shifts in Ontario. This allowed for comparisons to be made
over time with respect to the economic, political and social forces that have influenced affordable
housing policy. More importantly, the data gathered was not affected by reactivity, further
strengthening the analyses while complementing the interviews (Neuman & Robson, 2009).
Secondly, the use of in-depth interviews allowed me to employ a microscopic approach
to the research. That is, given the relatively small sample size, I was able to utilise a greater
number of open-ended questions to support my analyses. These were semi-structured in nature,
but allowed for free responses. This not only allowed respondents to answer questions in rich
detail, but also enabled me to probe further in particular responses.
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Thirdly, given the complex nature of the issue being explored, I was able to gain a
comprehensive understanding of respondents’ thoughts and opinions into the program and its
effects on the city. In essence, I was able to understand respondents’ reasoning behind their
opinions. It also allowed for a critical evaluation of the program and the discovery of
unanticipated findings, which were examined further (Neuman & Robson, 2009).
Lastly, owing to the fact that I have elected to examine the C-OAH program after being
introduced 10 years earlier, allowed for a more accurate analysis of the program. The results
generated are by no means premature in nature, but rather, an accurate account of the impact of
the program on the ground. It also allowed respondents to reflect on the program’s outputs and
outcomes throughout the years (2001-2008).
Despite the apparent strengths, the research methods also had several limitations. The
most notable include its relatively small sample size. Given that four out ten respondents agreed
to participate, I was unable to obtain a broader understanding of the impacts of the C-OAH
program. The sample is representative to a degree, but does not take into account the opinions of
the private for-profit sectors. Also, given that I conducted a case analysis, the results obtained
cannot be generalised across the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area.
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3

Literature Review
This section comprises of two main components: (a) definitions of key concepts and (b) a

review of Canadian housing policy. I operationalised the notions of affordable and social housing,
welfarism, neoliberalism, and post-welfarism as I used them in this paper. These concepts were
used to inform my analyses of the proposed research question, and thus required much attention.
Secondly, a literature review of Canadian housing policy has been conducted. Here, I examined
the shifts in housing policy since the 1940s onwards with a focus on welfarism, neoliberalism and
post-welfarism.
a. Definitions
Affordable Housing
There are many interpretations of what is meant by affordable housing. For example,
from the perspective of the Canadian government (both federal and provincial), affordable
housing refers to shelter that costs less than 30 per cent of a household’s before tax income
(CMHC, 2010). Unfortunately, this definition is quite narrow and unrealistic, and only represents
a small proportion of the population in need of housing that is adequate and suitable. More
importantly, it views affordability as being a static concept that represents a single point in time.
On the other hand, housing advocates such as the Ontario Non-Profit Housing
Association (ONPHA) interpret affordable housing as being part of a continuum rather a single
point. It ranges from vulnerable households in deep need, spending more than 50 per cent of their
income on rent, to those who may be able to afford the 30 per cent norm, but may still experience
housing need. These households may have a chronic need that requires continual support, or have
no support needs but experience low income due to factors such as weak labour market skills
(ONPHA, 2009). Consequently, affordable housing tends to mean different things to different
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people at different times (ONPHA, 2009). It is this viewpoint that I agree with, and have used to
inform my analyses.
Social Housing
Social housing is used to describe all forms of publicly assisted housing. These include
public, non-profit and co-op housing (Wolfe, 1998). The purpose of social housing is to provide
assistance to low- and moderate-income households obtain shelter that is adequate, suitable and
affordable. These include seniors, families, single parents, recent immigrants, and special needs
groups. It can be provided by municipalities, voluntary groups and community organizations such
as the YMCA/YWCA. A critical component to social housing is ensuring affordability.
Welfarism
The social welfare state or welfarism can be thought of as a loose set of social policies
and programs that provided Canadians with a modest level of economic security and social
support (Mulvale, 2001). It was designed to address specific problems of the day relating to the
production of goods and services and their distribution (Hulchanski, 2007). Also known as the
Keynesian welfare state, it began during the mid-1940s and lasted until the mid-1970s. According
to Fallis (2010), welfarism represented a new relationship between governments and their
citizens. Governments were seen as having a legitimate role in ensuring the welfare of its society.
In doing so, they were expected to mitigate the unequal distribution of income, wealth and
opportunity that were present within the markets.
Neoliberalism
Based on the literature surveyed, neoliberalism appears to be an elusive and highly
contested term that is rife with internal contradictions and inconsistencies. As a result, there are
countless viewpoints of how neoliberalism is defined and manifested locally. Nonetheless, it is a
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useful concept in examining the evolution of social housing policy in Ontario, particularly during
the 1990s. Within the context of this paper, I have elected to use Hayek (1944) and Friedman’s
(1962) interpretation of what is meant by neoliberalism. They have suggested that neoliberalism
is centered on three main ideas. Firstly, the individual is the normative center of society and
should be as unencumbered by rules and collective responsibilities as possible. That is, their
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills should be liberated (Bouderau et. al., 2009).
Secondly, the market is the most effective means through which individuals can maximise their
own utility functions. Lastly, state actions that interfere with either individual autonomy or
market relations lead to an autocratic society. In other words, the markets should be free from
state and bureaucratic controls (Bouderau et. al., 2009).
Neoliberalism therefore, can be viewed as a set of ideologies that promote the private
interests through deregulation, privatisation, liberalisation of the markets, and downsizing of
governments (Harvey, 2000). It has also been known to support the draconian cut-backs in the
welfare state, most notably in social services including housing. In essence, it is a belief that
guides the actions of governments. However, it is important to note that neoliberalism must be
viewed as being part of a situation-contingent application that is influenced by specific economic
structures, political culture and history (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). These influences will
determine the specific policies that will manifest themselves on the ground. Neoliberalism must
not be viewed as being part of a top-down process whereby the decisions of the senior levels of
government directly influence the on the ground impacts. Rather, the decisions of government
coupled with locally contingent realisations will influence how neoliberalism is manifested.
There are mainly two phases to neoliberalism: “roll-back” followed by “roll-out”.
According to Peck and Tickell, (2002) and Hackworth and Moriah (2006), “roll-back”
neoliberalism refers to the dismantling and deregulation of the Keynesian state policies including
public housing and public spaces. The second phase, formally known as “roll-out” neoliberalism,
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refers to the creation of new institutions and regulations of the state that promote neoliberal
ideologies.
Post-Welfarism
Post-welfarism or the post-welfare state is a relatively new model that is emerging in
North America and across Europe. It is thought to have emerged after the rise of neoliberalism
during the early 1990s. Much like the welfare state, post-welfarism seeks to pursue the same
fundamental objectives of social policy (Fallis, 2010). This includes deploying social programs as
the first line of defence against economic insecurity, not the last (Battle & Torjman, 2001).
However, post-welfarism recognises that governments alone cannot address issues of social
policy. That is, governments are not playing a major role in alleviating the inequities of the
markets. Rather, post-welfarism emphasises the need and importance of non-governmental actors
such non-profit and for-profit organisations in designing and delivering social programs (Battle &
Torjman, 2001). It also stresses the importance of adapting to the changing economic, political
and social realities within which governments must operate.
In many respects, the post-welfare state appears to have been heavily influenced by the
“roll-out” phase of neoliberalism. That is, much of its policies and programs appear to have
perpetuated the ideologies of neoliberalism. For example, apart from its emphasis on partnerships
with the private and voluntary sectors, it also seeks to reduce the size of governments. According
to Battle and Torjman (2001), this has been done through the reduction in duplication and overlap
within and between governments, particularly between the federal and provincial levels and their
delivery of social programs.
b. Canadian Housing Policy
The history of Canadian housing policy is quite complex. However, an understanding of
it is necessary in exploring the impacts of the C-OAH program on the City of Toronto. It will not
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only serve to contextualise ones understanding, but also shape the discussion to follow. In doing
so, I have elected to use George Fallis’ (2010) approach of dividing the history of housing policy
into four periods: 1945-1964, 1964-1978, 1978-1998, and 1998 to 2008. This allowed me to
categorise the evolution of housing into three main stages: welfarism, neoliberalism and postwelfarism. As suggested by Fallis (2010), the financial crisis of 2008 and its subsequent recession
represent another period of housing policy, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The first period of Canadian housing policy extended from 1945 to 1964, and is formally
known as the era of economic development (Leone & Carroll, 2010). During this time, the federal
government took a leading role in housing policy development. It was primarily focused on
transitioning out of a wartime economy into a period of stabilisation (Fallis, 2010). In doing so,
the federal government was interested in stimulating the growth and development of new housing
for war veterans, operationalising the private mortgage market, and building new dwellings to
overcome the backlog from the depression and war (Fallis, 2010). This period also saw the
creation of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), later renamed the Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation. This was a crown entity that was focused on providing
mortgage insurance and direct lending to returning war veterans and private developers. At this
point, the market was heavily focused on homeownership and the rise of suburban development.
For example, grants and loans were supplied by the federal government for the suburban
development of large-scale, medium-density housing (Carroll, 2002). According to Fallis (2010),
there was only a very small public housing program with no comprehensive housing policy in
place.
The second period, 1964 to 1978, represented a marked shift towards a comprehensive
housing policy in Canada. It can be classified as the era of social development. It began with the
National Housing Amendments (NHA), which saw the entrance of the provincial governments
into the housing sector (Leone & Carroll, 2010). This led to a series of cost sharing and direct
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subsidy programs for many housing initiatives. It also led to the creation of the short-lived
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, which has been credited for facilitating housing policies
involving all three levels of government. For example, home-ownership assistance programs,
housing for seniors, and income-integrated housing were all developed in cooperation with the
three levels of government (Carroll, 2002). This period also saw the widespread support for the
construction and ongoing funding of public housing. In fact, by 1970, over 10 per cent of housing
starts were public housing, which was targeted towards low-income households (Fallis, 2010).
Recipients of public housing were charged a rent geared to their income that required deep
ongoing subsidies from both the federal and provincial levels of government.
This period also led to the creation of non-profit and co-op housing programs. These were
operated by a third sector, formally known as the non-profit housing sector. This form of housing
relied heavily on cost-sharing funding and on-going subsidies from the CMHC and the provinces
(Fallis, 2010). In most cases, the funding mechanisms were based on 75:25 per cent cost
matching basis. That is, 75 per cent federal grants and 25 per cent provincial funds, with the
provinces requiring 10 per cent from municipalities (Wolfe, 1998). These programs were
developed with the intention of achieving social mixing within public housing. This was a rising
concern for many housing advocates during this era.
According to Leone and Carroll (2010), this phase led to the rise of the welfare state in
Canada, particularly in regards to housing policy. The goal of this period was to solve social
policy problems through rational problem-solving techniques that involved the introduction of
broader social-liberal discourses. Here, it was thought that people could be assisted in obtaining
better housing through expanding government funded housing initiatives. Governments were seen
as having a legitimate role in improving the welfare of its residents. Consequently, Canada was
moving towards a comprehensive housing policy with over 20,000 new social housing units being
constructed annually (Fallis, 2010).
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The 1978 to 1998 period, formally classified as the era of contraction, began with
concerns over rising government deficits, sluggish economic growth and increasing
unemployment (Leone & Carroll, 2010; Wolfe, 1998; Flavo, 2006). During this period, the
federal government was finding it difficult to sustain many of the social programs created during
the welfare state. As Fallis (2010) suggested, this led many policy makers into believing that the
welfare state had expanded too far, thereby becoming a drag on the economy. The net effect of
this was the cancellation of many federally sponsored housing programs, and a transition from a
strong federally controlled sector to that of a weak, almost non-existent one (Leone & Carroll,
2010). In effect, the federal government was disentangling itself from public housing. In many
ways, they wanted to reduce the overlap and duplication between federal and provincial
jurisdictions (Leone & Carroll, 2010). During the earlier part of this period, the CMHC no longer
provided mortgage loans to non-profit and co-op housing providers in financing the construction
of new units. Rather, these groups were required to secure mortgages through the private markets
(Fallis, 2010). However, they still continued to issue mortgage insurance to these organisations.
By 1994, the federal government had removed itself completely from the funding and
management of housing. As a result, housing responsibilities were downloaded onto the
provincial governments. As Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) and Schuk (2009) have argued,
downloading refers to the process through which the authority, responsibility and resources for
certain services are downloaded from one level of government to another. In terms of
expenditure, prior to 1994, the federal government had pledged approximately $2.13 billion for
housing; in 1995/96 and 1996/97, these figured dropped to $2.03 and $1.94 billion respectively
(Leone & Carroll, 2010). These cuts were crippling to the management and creation of affordable
housing initiatives in Canada, and specifically Ontario.
In Ontario, the issue was further compounded with the provincial election of Mike Harris
under a CSR manifesto in 1995. One of his main platforms was to reduce the overlap and
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duplication within and between governments – much like that of the federal government. This led
to the divestment and disengagement of the provincial government from the governing and
financing of social housing (Graham & Phillips, 1998). In this case, housing responsibilities were
further downloaded on municipalities. In doing so, Ontario cancelled all future housing
commitments and eliminated support for roughly 17,000 units that were already in the pipeline
(Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). To further exacerbate the problem, the province did not grant
municipalities any additional revenue generating authority. This, according to Schuk (2009) and
Hackworth and Moriah (2006) limited their ability to address the needs of the community, as they
did not have enough taxing authority to generate sufficient revenues for such expenditure. They
were forced to operate and deliver additional social services using their existing tax base, much of
which has been shrinking.
Upon the province’s exit, they agreed to a one-time investment of $215 million in capital
upgrades, $173 million to repair co-op housing and $42 million annually for public housing
(Graham & Phillips, 1998). Even though these may be construed as being significant investments,
municipalities were still unable to meet the rising demand for affordable housing, further
intensifying the existing housing crisis. For example, the Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association
(ONPHA) (2011) has noted that Ontario’s social housing waiting list has been steadily increasing
since 2004. There are currently 152,077 households on the waiting list, representing an increase
of over 21 per cent since 2004 (126,103).
The 1978 to 1998 era thus ultimately led to the rise of neoliberalism within the housing
policy sector, particularly within Ontario. The 1990s have been thought to represent the peak of
neoliberalism and the drastic “roll back” of welfare state policies. As Dalton (2009) suggested,
the inability of the welfare state to deal with changing economic conditions, particularly high and
persistent rates of inflation and employment, established a shift in thinking. It is this context that
gave rise to the ideologies of neoliberalism. This era, specifically with regards to the CSR
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movement has been thought of as a way of privatizing as much services as possible, especially
within the housing sector (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006; Kipfer and Keil, 2002; Keil, 2002). The
provincial government at the time believed that the markets would be able to solve the growing
housing crisis while it occupied a more limited role. The intent of which was to improve the
delivery of housing and forge new relationships with the private markets.
The final phase of housing policy, as defined within this paper, began in 1998 and ended
in 2008. It can be categorised as the era of federal reengagement. According to Fallis (2010), this
period signalled a shift in the economy to one of economic growth, low inflation and
unemployment, and reduced government deficit. These shifts allowed for the development of new
opportunities and initiatives within the housing sector. More importantly, the severity and
visibility of the growing housing crisis during the 1980s and 1990s, coupled with growing
pressures from municipalities and advocates propelled the issue of housing onto the federal
government’s agenda (Fallis, 2010; Leone & Carroll, 2010).
During this period, two unique programs were created by the federal government. Firstly,
in 1999, they launched the Supporting Community Partnership Initiative (SCPI) with the goal of
addressing homelessness. According to Flavo (2007), since 2000, the SCPI has provided
approximately $850 million in funding for “strategic investments that address homelessness”.
Secondly, in 2001, the federal government introduced the Affordable Housing Initiative
(AHI), which represented their first significant commitment since the 1990s. This was based on a
multilateral agreement with the federal, provincial and municipal governments on a costmatching basis of federal grants. These costs can be matched by any level of government or the
private sector (CMHC, 2011). Under this initiative, the federal government has decided to
decentralise decision making as to where federal monies can be spent to the provinces,
municipalities and, arguably, the private sectors (Leone & Carroll, 2010). That is, municipal
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service managers have been given granted the authority in determining the types of affordable
housing projects that are eligible for funding without federal oversight. Housing proponents from
the private and non-profit sectors can apply for funding from the service managers. This
represented a significant shift from previous eras, where the federal level took more of a
leadership role in the management of funds. During its first phase (2001), the federal government
committed $680 million towards rental housing, which was to be spent over five years. In 2003,
they contributed another $320 million for the funding of affordable housing for targeted lowincome households, resulting in a total of $1 billion (Leone & Carroll, 2010; Flavo, 2007). In
2005, an additional $1.6 billion was pledged by the federal government for the provision of
affordable housing (Flavo, 2007). However, this was not part of the AHI and was therefore not
considered within this paper.
This period represented the emergence of a post-welfare state that has been heavily
influenced by the neoliberal ideologies of the 1990s. To a large extent, it can be classified as the
“roll-out” phase within the neoliberal regime that sought to create new regulations and
institutions. For example, the AHI’s decentralisation of decision making as to how federal monies
can be spent appears to have further allowed for an affordable housing sector that is heavily
reliant on the private sector. The AHI also recognises the importance of partnerships with the
private for-profit and non-profit sectors in addressing the issue of affordable housing. It is this
shift that I was interested in examining, particularly with regards to its impact on the City of
Toronto.
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Table 1: Canadian housing policy stages
Policy Stages (focus on Ontario)

Characteristics

Economic development

Social development

1945-1964

1964-1978

Contraction

Reengagement

1978-1998
Time

1998-2008
1978-1994

Intergovernmental

Federal leadership

1994-1998

Multi-level governance
consultation

Provincial
leadership

Municipal
leadership

Tri-level consultation

Non-profit and
for-profit
sectors, local
governments

Cost sharing between
governments and the
private sector

Delivery instruments

Federal loans and grants

Cost sharing and direct
subsidies and loans

Loan guarantees,
mortgage
insurances and
coproduction

Economic conditions

Reconstruction and
prosperity

Prosperity and inflation

Recession and high government
deficits

Economic growth and
high government
surpluses

Policy framework

Beginning of the welfare
state

The welfare state

Neoliberalism

Emergence of post
welfare state
Source: Carroll & Leone, 2010; Fallis, 2010
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Hypotheses
In exploring the proposed research question, a series of hypotheses were developed.

These were informed through the theoretical frameworks outlined earlier including neoliberalism
and post-welfarism. These hypotheses were used as a means of teasing out possible questions to
be considered during the interview process. It also served to guide the discussion and analyses.
Based on the review of the literature, the following have been suggested:
1. The post-welfare state recognised the importance of partnerships with non-governmental
actors. As such, the C-OAH program has allowed for greater flexibility in enticing nonprofit and private sector organisations in participating within the process of developing
new affordable housing. Within the context of this paper, the term private sector refers to
for-profit organisations such as private developers.
2. The retrenchment of governments within the housing sector during the 1978-1998 era
precipitated a reliance on private sector involvement in providing affordable housing.
Consequently, the proceeding period, which the C-OAH program was created, has further
continued to perpetuate this reliance on private sector involvement. That is, the program’s
successful operation is dependent on its ability to engage the private sector.
3. The post-welfare state places fewer burdens on governments, particularly at the senior
levels, in delivering affordable housing. Therefore, the intention of the C-OAH program
is to divest the federal government of the burden of initiating and delivering new
affordable housing programs. They are more interested in supporting limited programmes
of capital assistance rather than addressing the root causes of the affordable housing crisis
plaguing many urban centers such as Toronto.
The remainder of this paper is divided into two sections. First, I discussed the broad setup
and structure of the C-OAH program. This included its objective, program components, funding

21
allocations and responsibilities of municipal service managers. Next, I examined the detailed
findings based on the triangulation of interviews and documentary data from Toronto.
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Overview of the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing (C-OAH) Program
In Ontario, the AHI is operated under the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing (C-OAH)

program (refer to figure 1). The main objective of this program is to increase the supply of
affordable housing in Ontario through partnerships with all levels of government and housing
stakeholders. This includes private and non-profit housing providers such as co-ops, service
clubs, religious and charitable organisations, and municipal non-profits (MMAH, 2006). There
are four main components to the program: housing allowance/rent supplements, rental and
supportive housing, northern housing and homeownership.

Figure 1: Overall Structure of the AHI program
Affordable Housing
Initiative (AHI) Framework

Canada-Ontario Affordable
Housing (C-OAH) Program
Agreement

Housing
allowance/rent
supplements

Rental and
supportive
housing

Northern
Housing

Cost-shared Programs

Federal $

Northern
Housing

Cost-matched Programs

Ontario $

Unilateral Ontario $

Municipal Service
Managers deliver program

Source: CMHC, 2007
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Within the context of this paper, I examined the rental and supportive housing
component, which is primarily focused on providing financial assistance to non-profit and private
developers. It required a total of $364 million in federal and provincial contributions, representing
the largest share of the four components (see table 2). The program has created some 5,440 units
across Ontario (City of Toronto, 2006). Within the City of Toronto, over $79 million have been
allocated towards the creation of new affordable rental housing under the program. This has
resulted in creation of some 1,135 affordable rental units (see table 3). The rental and supportive
housing component is therefore a significant aspect of the C-OAH program as it generated the
most affordable units of the various components.
Table 2: Program funding and unit allocation (Ontario)
Program component

Units

Total Funding

Housing
allowance/rent
supplements

5,000

$80M

Rental and supportive
housing
Northern housing
Homeownership
Total

Funding per unit

Progress
(as of 2006)

$20 - $360/month
499 units
Average $266/month
4,000 rental
1,200 supportive
1,500
4,500

$280M
$84M
$30M
$36M

16,200

$510M

Average $70,000

5,440 units

Average $20,000
Average $6,500
to $10,000

200 units
884 units
7,023 units

Source: MMAH, 2006; City of Toronto, 2006
Table 3: Program funding and unit allocation (City of Toronto)
Program component

Units

Total funding

Housing allowance/rent supplements
Rental and supportive housing
Homeownership
Total

1,800
1,135
729
3,664

$37.80
$79.45
$6.345
$123.595

Source: MMAH, 2006; City of Toronto, 2006
According to the MMAH (2006), the rental and supportive component aims to reduce the
capital costs for rental and supportive housing units developed through new construction,
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acquisition and conversion, or through additions and renovations to existing stock. It also enables
housing providers to achieve rent levels that are below average market rents for a minimum of 20
years. In fact, rents are required to be at or below 80 per cent of CMHC’s Average Market Rent
(AMR). For example, in 2006, the AMR for the City of Toronto was $1,061. Under the C-OAH
program, housing providers would be required to charge a maximum monthly rent of $849
(Government of Ontario, 2006). The program is primarily targeted towards the vulnerable
populations including Aboriginal peoples; recent immigrants; persons with disabilities; persons
living with mental illness; low-income seniors; victims of violence; and the working poor.
As indicated in table 2, the average combined federal and provincial contribution per
affordable rental unit is $70,000. Of this, 38 per cent or $26,600 is provided by the federal
government as up-front capital, which is available during the development and construction phase
of projects. The remaining 62 per cent or $43,400 is provided by the Government of Ontario,
which is used to finance the 20 year minimum affordability payment (MMAH, 2006). Funding
from this initiative is provided on a five year renewal basis. An important caveat to the program is
the requirement that housing projects be “shovel ready” within three months of being approved
by Municipal Service Managers.
In operating the program, the role of the municipality, through Ontario’s 47 Consolidated
Municipal Service Managers, is to (MMAH, 2006):
a) plan and facilitate local affordable housing investments with local partners;
b) ensure the appropriate target groups and clients are assisted by programs;
c) provide appropriate development incentives to support proponents participating in the
program including waiving development charges or equalisation of property taxes;
d) establish local procurement processes including soliciting and selecting eligible
projects and/or households to the province; and
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e) ensure program compliance and reporting, especially in regards to the 20 year
affordability period
Service managers therefore play a critical role in ensuring that the program is successful in
achieving its objective. As illustrated in figure 1, they are the ones responsible for implementing
and operating the program on a local level. According to the MMAH (2006), service managers
are in the best position to build partnerships within the community that address local needs.
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Findings and Discussion
In discussing my findings, I have elected to categorise the results into three recurring

themes that became apparent during the interview process. These included having a reliance on
private sector involvement; the perpetuation of band-aid solutions; and the influences of
NIMBYism and the role of the OMB. Within each category, I have attempted to address the
issues brought forth within the hypotheses suggested.
a. Reliance on private sector involvement
The reengagement of the federal level within the social housing sector has increased the
reliance on private sector involvement for the provision of affordable housing in postamalgamated Toronto. This has been attributed to the senior level governments’ exit from the
housing sector during the early 1990s. More specifically, the draconian cuts that followed their
exit forced many housing experts to abandon the sector in search of alternative employment,
ultimately rendering the sector inoperable (TCHC, 2011; City Staff 1, 2011).
When the federal government introduced the C-OAH program in 2001, the City found
itself at a crossroads. Since they lacked the necessary skills and expertise needed within the
housing field, they were required to partner with private sector housing developers (City Staff 1,
2011). The reason being that they possessed the necessary efficiencies and capabilities required to
stimulate the production of affordable rental units (City Staff 2, 2011). They had the initial capital
investments required to get projects “shovel ready” within three months from being approved,
which was a prerequisite for funding. In comparison, non-profit housing providers lacked the
necessary capacities required to meet this three month rule, ultimately making it difficult for them
to qualify for funding. Many non-profits did not have the initial capital investment required to get
projects started. For this reason, both the city and province favoured increasing partnerships with
private developers (TCHC, 2011). In fact, during the procurement process, the city staffs have
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been found to favour private sector housing projects over those from non-profit housing providers
(City Staff 1, 2011). For example, upon proponents (both private and non-profit sectors)
submitting their housing proposal, city staff were required to determine which projects had a
greater likelihood of being approved by Service Mangers. In doing so, staff tended to overlook
many non-profit housing proposals as it was felt that they could not meet the program’s
prerequisites (City Staff 1, 2011).
This preference for private sector involvement can also be traced to many provincial and
city led initiatives. This includes the Municipal Housing Facility by-law and reduced property
taxes, both of which were granted under the amendments to the Municipal Act in 2001. From a
provincial perspective, this allowed for greater flexibility in attracting private sector interests to
the sector. On a local level, these initiatives were used as a means of enticing private sector
developers in entering into partnerships with the city. The Municipal Housing Facility by-law,
enacted in 2002, provides loans and/or grants to the private sector in the form of waived
municipal development charges for the provision of affordable housing (City of Toronto, 2002).
The city also provides tax incentives to private developers who receive C-OAH program funding.
For example, multi-residential properties can qualify for a residential property tax rate, which is
substantially lower. This further entices private developers to participate within the program. For
example, within the City of Toronto, the current city tax rate for residential properties (excluding
the education tax rate) is 0.56 per cent, while the multi-residential tax rate is pegged at 1.86 per
cent, resulting in a difference of 1.30 per cent (City of Toronto, 2011c). While these programs
may be construed as ensuring the affordability of units, its primary goals has been to attract
private sector developers. It should be noted that these incentives are applicable to both private
and non-profit sectors. However, it has been more successful in garnering private sector approval
given the potential financial gains.
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Another interesting finding relates to the fact that much like the city, non-profit housing
providers including the TCHC, have been found to rely on private sector involvement. In the case
of the TCHC, they are heavily reliant on private sector involvement, particularly during the
construction phases (TCHC, 2011). According to the TCHC respondent interviewed (2011), the
organisation cannot provide new affordable units without partnering with the private sector. That
is, they must always contract out projects to private developers. This is due to the fact that they,
much like the city, lack the necessary expertise required for the construction of new units. In
attracting developers to the process, the TCHC has agreed to facilitate the planning approval
process including development applications, official plan and zoning by-law amendments and
consultations, while the developer is solely responsible for the construction of units (TCHC,
2011).
The TCHC has also been involved in fostering public-private partnerships that favour the
private sector. This a cooperative venture that is undertaken with the involvement of private and
public sectors that builds on the expertise of each partner (CCPPP, 2009; Moskalyk, 2008;
Wallace et al., 1998). A recent example of this type of partnership is the revitalisation of
Toronto’s Regent Park, located in east downtown Toronto. While the revitalisation did not create
additional affordable rental units, it is still a useful case to examine since the project involved a
$1 billion reinvestment, over half of which was covered by private capital and funding from the
C-OAH program. The redevelopment is one that utilized a public-private partnership agreement
among all three levels of government, the TCHC, and Daniels Corporation, which is a private
developer. The TCHC’s interest in public-private partnerships has been partially guided by the
principles of the CSR movement. That is, there is an increased reliance on the market, rather than
governments in providing affordable housing to residents. As suggested by the housing advocate
interviewed (2011), public-private partnerships are seen as a means of obtaining funding as
governments are not injecting a sufficient amount of funds into the sector. This demonstrates the
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fact that market-based logics are being utilised within the City of Toronto and its municipally
operated housing provider.
Despite the perceived successfulness of entering into partnerships with the private sector,
several disadvantages have been identified. The most notable includes having a fragmented
housing sector whereby specific areas within the city are given more attention than others
(Advocate, 2011). For example, the successful engagement of the private-sector in the
revitalisation of Regent Park is, arguably, attributed to its strategic location within the City of
Toronto; it is situated just south of Cabbagetown in east downtown Toronto. Cabbagetown, once
considered a ‘slum’, has since been successfully gentrified into an urban place that attracts
professionals and urbanites. As James (2010) has noted, many critics to the revitalisation of
Regent Park have citied that the entrance of a private developer was a means of facilitating the
gentrification of the neighbourhood, much like that of Cabbagetown.
In this regard, there has been little effort in attracting the private-sector to participate in
similar ventures across the city. The case that stands out is the Jane-Finch neighbourhood of north
Toronto. Similar to Regent Park, this neighbourhood consists of a large-scale production of
public housing (Boudreau et. al., 2009). It also comprises of a comparable demographic to that of
Regent Park and has been branded as being plagued by poverty, crime and violence. The only
major difference between Regent Park and Jane-Finch is their spatial location within the city. The
Jane-Finch neighbourhood is not strategically located within the downtown core, nor is it in an
area that can attract a varied socio-demographic populace. In these instances, it quickly becomes
apparent that attracting private developers will depend on whether or not they perceive the
venture as being a profitable one.
Nonetheless, the fact that the C-OAH program is heavily reliant on private sector
involvement and partnerships does not come as a surprise. Rather, it is an expected outcome as
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the post-welfare state has been heavily influenced by the shifts in economic and political culture
during the 1990s. It does, after all, represent the “roll out” phase of the neoliberalism. These were
premised on dismantling the welfare state gains of the 1970s, thereby reducing the size of
governments and liberalising the markets. Much of the literature surveyed have suggested that
these policies, particularly with regards to the CSR movement, have led to the marketisation of
many social services such as affordable housing (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006; Kipfer and Keil,
2002; Keil, 2002). The fact that the C-OAH program emphasizes the need and reliance for private
sector involvement in delivering the program suggests that there is real reliance on them. There is
an acknowledgement that governments alone cannot address the issue of housing affordability.
b. The perpetuation of band-aid solutions
Another theme that emerged during discussions with respondents is the fact that the COAH program has led to the perpetuation of band-aid solutions within the City of Toronto. That
is, there is a tendency to provide temporary solutions that do not address the root causes of the
affordable housing crisis. As suggested by respondents, this has been a result of several factors
including a narrow definition of what is considered affordable housing, and providing episodic
funding that is based primarily on population rather than need. These have limited the city’s
ability in creating long-term comprehensive housing policies and initiatives (City Staff 1, 2011;
TCHC, 2011; Advocate, 2011).
The notion of affordable housing is quite elusive. It can mean different things to different
people at different times. According to the MMAH (2006), affordable housing within the context
of the C-OAH program is defined as dwellings that cost less than 30 per cent of a household’s
before-tax income. This definition is quite vague and unrepresentative of the crisis being faced
within Toronto. It appears as though there is a disconnect between what the senior levels of
government define as affordable and what is happening on the ground (Advocate, 2011). Their
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definition is unrealistic and fails to take into consideration those who may be in core housing
need, spending more than 30 per cent of their income on rent (Advocate, 2011). These individuals
may be in a chronic state of core housing need, requiring on-going rent supplements. For
example, according to the City of Toronto (2011a), in 2006, over 23 per cent or 216,070
households spent more than 30 per cent of their income on rent within Toronto. Of these, 70 per
cent or 154,190 households were renters. Under the C-OAH’s mandate, it is unlikely that these
households will be able to benefit substantially from the program (Advocate, 2011).
As suggested from discussions with interviewees, the federal government’s use of this
definition was a result of them wanting an interpretation that required limited funding, and could
be reached through the initial capital subsidies provided (Advocate, 2011). That is, an initial
subsidy to the construction of affordable rental units is small compared to on-going shelter
allowances required to maintain realistic affordable rents. The result of this is that housing
providers cannot maintain rents at below market levels, but rather, must go below economic rents.
However, such an approach barely meets any definition of affordability (TCHC, 2011). In fact,
Dalton (2009) and Pomeroy (2003) have noted that the federal government has maintained a
position of not entering into any new initiatives that involve on-going subsidies. Rather, they are
only prepared to enter into a limited programme of capital assistance for additional public
housing. This places fewer burdens on governments and allows them to put relatively minimal
resources into developing new units (Advocate, 2011). Within the context of a post-welfare state,
this is an expected outcome as there are fewer burdens placed on governments in addressing
social inequities (Battle & Torjman, 2001). They have limited their responsibility to the provision
of capital investments, transferring all other responsibilities onto municipalities, and arguably, the
private sector.
Another aspect to this is the reliance on episodic funding that is based on the size of a
city’s population rather than its population need for affordable housing (Advocate, 2011; City
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Staff 1, 2011). Within the City of Toronto, this is a particularly pressing issue as it limits their
ability to address the core issue of housing affordability, which is providing on-going rent
supplements to households in core need. As demonstrated within tables 4 and 5, while Toronto
received the largest “chunk” of C-OAH program funding ($79M) resulting in some 1,135 units,
this was not sufficient in addressing the city’s needs. That is, of the 154,190 renting households in
need, only 1,135 have been able to gain access to affordable rental units. This represents a mere
0.7 per cent of the total renting population (see table 6). To further exacerbate the problem, this
does not include the 66,000 currently on the social housing waiting list. When compared to the
regional municipalities of Durham, Halton and York, 1.5 per cent, 1.8 per cent and 1.4 per cent
respectively were able to access affordable rental units. Despite these relatively small
percentages, one is able to clearly identify the disconnect between housing need and the funding
being provided. In many respects, Toronto has not been able to receive an equitable portion of
federal funding when compared to other municipalities within the GTA. The federal government
has chosen to ignore the fact that the Toronto is home to a burgeoning vulnerable population that
is much larger than that of any other municipality within the GTAH and Ontario. By virtue of
this, they require a substantial amount of federal government investments.
Table 4: GTA rental and supportive housing funding and unit allocation
Regional Municipalities
City of Toronto
Regional Municipality of Peel
Regional Municipality of Durham
Regional Municipality of Halton
Regional Municipality of York
Subtotal GTA

Funding (M)
$79.45
$32.55
$11.20
$8.40
$25.90
$157.50

Units
1,135
465
160
120
370
2,250
Source: MMAH, 2006
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Table 5: Central Ontario (exc. GTA) rental and supportive housing funding and unit allocation
Regional Municipalities
County of Simcoe
County of Dufferin
City of Hamilton
District Municipality of Muskoka
Regional Municipality of Niagara
Subtotal Central exc. GTA

Funding (M)
$10.85
$1.05
$15.40
$1.75
$7.70
$36.75

Units
155
15
220
25
110
525
Source: MMAH, 2006

Table 6: Percentage of renting household accessing C-OAH program funded rental units
Regional Municipality
City of Toronto
Regional Municipality of Durham
Regional Municipality of Halton
Regional Municipality of York

Renters in
housing need
154,190
11,025
6,500
25,730

Units from
C-OAH program
1135
160
120
370

Per cent being
housed
0.7%
1.5%
1.8%
1.4%

Source: City of Toronto, 2011
Coupled with this is the issue of having episodic funding that continues to diminish
throughout the years. Federal grants are disbursed in five years “chunks”, which limits most
municipalities, particularly the City of Toronto from having a long-term sustainable housing
strategy. For example, the city’s affordable housing action plan for 2010-2012, formally known
as the Housing Opportunities Toronto (HOT) plan, is dependent on a long-term financing plan
from the federal and provincial governments. This plan proposes 67 actions within eight strategic
themes that are directed towards to the provision of affordable housing within Toronto3. As per
the plan, $484 million in annual investments are needed over the next 10 years to assist 257,700

3

As per the Affordable Housing Action Plan, the eight strategic themes guiding the 67 actions for
affordable housing includes:
1. Creating housing opportunities in all neighbourhoods
2. Helping homeless and vulnerable people find and keep homes
3. Assisting individuals and families to afford rents
4. Preserving and repairing rental housing
5. Revitalizing neighbourhoods
6. Creating new affordable rental homes
7. Helping people to buy and stay in their homes
8. Working together
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households struggling with high housing costs or inadequate accommodations (City of Toronto,
2009). Despite the city’s repeated attempts of obtaining such a long-term investment strategy,
they have been unsuccessful. According to the City Staff 1 (2011), this is one of the main issues
grappling the city as there no way of predicting whether the federal government will renew its COAH program funding commitments. It is this uncertainty that makes it difficult to plan for the
long-term.
The other aspect to the problem is the fact that the funding levels are constantly
decreasing and changing as the program progresses. As illustrated in figure 2, funding has begun
to decline at a rapid pace since 2008 and will need to be replaced. For example, in 2008, the city
lost $570,000 in federal funding, and in 2009, it lost a further $1,082,405 (City of Toronto, 2007).
By 2015, it is expected to decrease by an additional $31,000,000 annually. These cuts are a result
of the federal government electing not to reinvest funds from expiring federal social housing
agreements back into social housing (City of Toronto, 2007). By doing so, the viability of
existing affordable housing within Toronto is at risk of being lost. The city’s tax base is the only
source of on-going revenue for housing, which makes it difficult to sustain. It is not an
appropriate mechanism for funding social housing.
Figure 2: Withdrawal of federal funding for social housing in the City of Toronto, 2001-2029

Source: City of Toronto, 2007
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There appears to be a limited reengagement of the federal level within the social housing
sector. On the ground, the C-OAH program has made little impact on the City of Toronto’s
affordable housing crisis. The program places fewer burdens on the federal and provincial
governments in delivering affordable housing. Their insufficient level of funding has only led to
the perpetuation of band-aid solutions that do not address the issue of core housing need. Based
on the findings, it is suggested that the federal government is only interested in solving some
immediate concerns rather than addressing the root causes of housing affordability.
c. The Influences of NIMBYism and the Importance of the OMB
The management of social housing at the municipal level is complex to say the least.
Apart from the absence of appropriate funding, social housing decision making is also influenced
by local political forces that derive from NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard). This has been
particularly evident within land-use planning in Toronto, and is in fact, a major barrier to the
provision of affordable housing. Specifically, the influences of NIMBYism on the planning
process have been found to contribute to the continued opposition of affordable housing within
particular communities. For example, during the start of 2010, councillors were faced with a
controversial proposal to legalise rooming houses across Toronto. These are considered a form of
affordable housing for low-income persons and workers (Kwan, 2010). The purpose of this
proposal was to harmonise the rules to make rooming houses legal in areas such as Scarborough,
which would stimulate further developments (Kwan, 2010). However, many Scarborough
councillors opposed the proposal, stating that their constituents did not want these types of
housing located within their community. In fact, many suggested that they were a “threat to
single-family homes and the community’s character” (Kwan, 2010). According to the OHRC
(2011), these discriminatory neighbourhood opposition that is, NIMBYism creates a formidable
land-use barrier to building affordable housing projects. These negative attitudes tend to delay,
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halt or restrict many affordable housing developments within Toronto. More importantly
NIMBYism heavily influences local political forces, as demonstrated within the case.
With the reengagement of the federal level, Toronto has witnessed a snail’s pace of
affordable housing development. Nonetheless, these developments tend to garner strong resident
oppositions within communities, pushing the production of affordable housing into certain parts
of the city (Advocate, 2011). This is especially true for non-profit housing organisations such as
service clubs, religious groups and charitable organisations as they are often times directed
towards a particular demographic within communities. This tends to lead to neighbourhood
opposition among residents (Advocate, 2011). In this regard, the OMB has been an influential
body in mediating potential conflicts. The OMB is an independent administrative tribunal
responsible for hearing appeals and deciding on various contentious municipal matters including
land-use planning issues (MMAH, 2010). In terms of land-use matters, the OMB must base its
decision on sound land use planning principles as set forth within the Planning Act and Provincial
Policy Statements (PPS). Within the City of Toronto, the OMB has been successful in driving
affordable housing production in areas that may oppose its development (Advocate, 2011). As
suggested by Moore (2010), while the OMB may erode local politicians’ decision making
authority, it allows them (local politicians) to evade responsibility for unpopular decisions. They
are not influenced by NIMBYism or political will, but rather, by the planning principles set forth.
The OMB has also been found to negatively influence the decision making process within
Toronto. As indicated by City Staff 1 (2011), the fact that planning applications involving
affordable housing could end up at the OMB drastically influences the selection of projects.
Proposals that are brought to the OMB are time consuming and expensive for the city and
developers. Consequently, in selecting affordable housing projects, city staffs have developed a
scoring process that reviews the likelihood of applications ending up at the OMB (City Staff 1,
2011). In doing so, they neglect projects that require substantial amendments to the official plan
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and zoning by-laws, and those that may be perceived as being contentious – garnering
neighbourhood opposition. This tends to shortlist many applicants during the approvals process,
ignoring projects that may be of value to particular neighbourhoods within the city.
Unfortunately, the city has taken a complacent role where they are guided by proposals that are
more likely to be approved, rather than those that are deemed vital to communities. The
reengagement of the federal level therefore, has allowed for the further intervention of a
provincial body within the affordable housing sector that has significant influences on the types
of decisions being made at the local level. It should be noted that the federal level’s reengagement
did not precipitate the OMB’s involvement, but rather, increased the need for provincial
oversight. Their role is to attenuate the influences of NIMBYism on land-use policies that are
associated with the construction of affordable housing. However, while they support sound
planning decisions, they can negatively influence the ways in which local decisions are made in
the selection of affordable housing projects.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the reengagement of the federal level within the affordable housing sector

has significantly influenced the ways in which affordable housing is delivered within the City of
Toronto. More specifically, the C-OAH program has further increased the reliance on private
sector involvement, and has continued to perpetuate band-aid solutions that fail to address the
affordable housing crisis plaguing the city. This has been attributed to the federal government
placing fewer burdens on themselves. It has refused to develop new housing initiatives, and have
limited its involvement to only providing initial capital investments to creating affordable
housing. There is no long-term, consistent and substantive funding mechanism in place to
sustaining housing in Toronto.
So, despite the C-OAH program representing the federal government’s first significant
commitment since the 1990s, its involvement has been limited in many ways. It appears as
though the neoliberal ideologies of the 1990s have begun to influence the ways in which
affordable housing is managed within the post-welfare state. There is an acknowledgement that
governments alone, particularly the senior levels, cannot address issues of social need. Rather,
there is a dependence on non-governmental actors, most notably the private sector in designing
and delivering social programs to citizens. This should not come as a surprise as the dismantling
of the affordable housing net during the 1990s crippled many parts of the sector, rendering it
inoperable. Much of the skills and expertise required were lost during this period and has not yet
resurfaced.
The findings also suggest that housing policy at the local level is subjected to provincial
oversight through the OMB. This serves to attenuate the influences of NIMBYism on land-use
policies that are associated with the construction of affordable housing. This is a result of local
decision making being highly susceptible to political forces that are fuelled by NIMBYism. These
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forces can act in ways that limit the production of affordable housing within certain parts of the
city. As such, there must be a mechanism in place, in this case the OMB, which is not easily
influenced by external forces. Rather, their decisions must be guided by policies that promote
good planning within the city such as an Official Plan.
While the premise of this paper was to examine the influences of the C-OAH program on
the City of Toronto, it has also demonstrated the importance of senior level government
commitments within a post-welfare state. Housing policy at the local level cannot thrive without
some form of government intervention. The 1990s has clearly demonstrated the impacts of taking
such an approach. That is, the market alone is not the best mechanism for allocating goods and
services as it does not take into consideration issues of equity. Rather, housing policies are
dependent on a long-term commitment from governments including funding, and some form of
oversight.
On a final note, it is important to acknowledge that the housing policy landscape within
Toronto is rapidly evolving with the continued emergence of the post-welfare state. This paper
has merely scratched the surface of the longer term impacts of having the federal government
reengaged within the sector, albeit limited. This paper does suggest that the affordable housing
crisis is still alive and continues to plague the city.
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Recommendations
Based on the analysis undertaken, several recommendations have been brought forth.

These include:
1. Lobbying the federal and provincial governments to committing to a long-term,
consistent and substantive funding agreement for the City of Toronto. This includes the
provision of on-going rent subsidies to households in need. As demonstrated, simply
providing capital grants for affordable housing do not address the core issues of
affordability.
2.

Expanding the federal government’s interpretation of affordable housing. Currently, the
definition used is unrealistic and vague. This is largely due to the fact that they view
affordability as being a static point, rather than as a continuum. In doing so, they will be
better able to respond to crisis plaguing many urban cities.

3. Ensuring that there is continued provincial oversight in the development and management
of affordable housing. Decisions at the local level can be easily influenced by residents
and other stakeholder groups. Consequently, there must be some type of mechanism to
ensuring that sound planning decisions are being made.
4. Creating better opportunities for genuine non-profit sector involvement. This includes
modifying program requirements such as the “shovel ready” rule as a means of attracting
and facilitating non-profit sector involvement. This sector has faced the burnt force of the
draconian cutbacks during the 1990s and continues to struggle within the sector.
Governments must acknowledge that this sector plays a vital role in development
affordable housing in many vulnerable communities.
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Further Research
In moving ahead, the research conducted has raised additional questions that would

benefit from further study. More specifically, it is recommended that interview component of the
paper be expanded to include a wider range of stakeholders. These might include for-profit
organisations, religious and charitable groups and community institutions. In doing so, one would
be able to obtain a broader perspective on the influences of the federal government’s
reengagement within the social housing sector on Toronto. This would allow one to examine the
particular challenges involved in engaging the non-profit sectors as they have been unable to
maintain their expertise within the field.
Secondly, it might be useful to compare and contrast the impacts of the C-OAH program
on municipalities across the Greater Toronto Area. As funding is based primarily on population, it
would of interest to examine its effects and influences, particularly in regards to the reliance of
the private sector. In doing so, the researcher must acknowledge that the City of Toronto is a
unique case analysis as it home to over 2.5 million residents. The political, social and economic
forces driving the city will be different from other cities within the GTA.
Lastly, a critical component that could be researched further pertains to the role of the
OMB in facilitating the development of affordable housing within the City of Toronto. In this
regard, it would be of great interest to examine the amount of cases brought forth to the OMB in
regards to affordable housing issues and their proceeding decisions. This is a particularly
important field to consider since the OMB has been found to play a major role in the development
industry within Toronto.
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List of Interviews
Advocate:

Center for Equality Rights in Accommodation Representative

City Staff 1:

City of Toronto, Affordable Housing Office Representative

City Staff 2:

City of Toronto, City Planning Department Representative

TCHC:

Toronto Community Housing Corporation Representative
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Appendix I
Table 7: Incidence of core housing need within select CMAs, 2002-2007
Percentage (%)
CMA

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Halifax

14.9

13.3

13.6

10.2

15

12.2

Montreal

13.2

13.4

12.1

14

13.8

12.3

Quebec

8.7

7.5

8.9

8.7

8

8.1

Ottawa-Gatineau

12.4

15

13.7

13.9

14

10.4

Toronto

18.5

17.8

19.1

18.9

17.6

17.2

Winnipeg

9.2

8.7

9.9

10

10.4

10.4

Saskatoon

12

10.9

9.8

11.8

13.3

9.6

11.8

12.3

8.8

7.3

9.6

10.6

Edmonton

12

10.6

11.3

9.6

8.3

10.4

Vancouver

19.4

18.1

17.4

15

17

15.2

Urban Canada

13.9

13.9

13.6

13.5

13.1

12.4

Calgary

Source: CMHC, 2010
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Appendix II
Figure 1: Ontario municipalities’ current housing expenditure vs. federal and provincial specific purpose transfers, 1988-2008

Ontario Municipalities Current Housing Expenditure vs. Federal and
Provincial Specific Purpose Transfers (1988-2008)
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